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ABSTRACT
The opening up of an economy to the rest of the world has generally
been considered an Integral part of economic reform aimed at increasing the
role of markets. Until recently, however, very little discussion was devoted
to the order in which the capital and current account should be liberalized in
developing countries.
This paper deals with several aspects of the order of liberaliza-
tion. The different arguments usually given to advocate a particular ordering
are critically reviewed. Then a three-good two—factor model is used to
analyze the effects of alternative ordering on production and income distribu-
tion. A two—period model of a small economy is also used to investigate the
welfare effects of opening the capital account in the presence of distor-
tions. While the discussion does not yield a theorem regarding the appro-
priate order of liberalization, there are strong presumptions that it is more
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For many years economists have argued that developing countries
should rely more heavily on the market mechanism. In particular it hasbeen
argued that liberalization processes, consisting of "freeing" domestic markets
and opening up the economy to the rest of the world, should be implemented. A
large amount of effort and resources have been devoted to the study of the
relationship between the degree of market use, economic efficiency and eco-
nomic growth. These studies have resulted in the accumulation of an impres-
sive body of empirical evidence that indicates that liberalized and export—
oriented economies outperform -—bothin terms of growth and equitable income
distribution -—repressedand closed economies. .1!However,despite this
evidence, and the widespread belief among economists of the merits of liberal-
izing the LDC's economies, little serious efforts to that effect have been
taken by these countries. Many times liberalization attempts are frustrated
at different stages, with these economies reverting to repressed inward—
looking developing strategies.
Why, then, if liberalization is so desirable don't we observe more
successful liberalization attempts? There are a number of possible answers to
this question. First, even if a liberalization process results in an overall
(for the economy as a whole) welfare gain, there are sectors that will gain
and sectors that will lose from it. If losing sectors are politically power-
ful they may frustrate these liberalization efforts. This problem becomes
I"Harberger1958; Little et al. 1970; Krueger 1978; Balassa 1971, 1982;
Bhagwati 1978; Bhagwati and Srinivasan 1978; Krueger 1978, 1981, 1983.
On the order of liberalization see Edwards (1985b).
This statement, of course, assumes away the possibility of fully
compensating the losers of the liberalization effort.—2—
more complicated once it is recognized that short—run winners and losersmay
differ from long—run winners and losers [see Mayer 1970, Mussa 19714]. Froma
policy perspective this fact suggests that the identification of different
groups affected by the liberalization process, and the possible compensation
of(short—run?)losers could be important to generate a successfulprocess.
Second, to the extent that there are short-run rigidities and
adjustment costs, a liberalization process may result in short-run output (and
welfare) losses. Even if these losses are more than compensated in thefuture
——withthe present value of the change in society's welfare being positive ——
governmentsmay be reluctant to embark into a liberalization episode. The
reason for this is that the time horizon relevant to a governmentmay be
different (i.e.., shorter) than that relevant to theeconomy as a whole. From
a policy perspective this problem indicates that the analysis of thedynamics
of liberalization ——differencesbetween short— and long—run effects ——is
critical. Once this dynamic process is understood, policies aimed atreducing
the short—run costs of the adjustment could be implemented.
Third, many times liberalizations have been attempted at the same
ti.meas a major stabilization program, aimed at reducing inflation and solving
a serious balance of payments crisis, is underway. 1"Asa result of this the
costs of the liberalization process are confused with those of the stabiliza-
tion program, with the consequent resistance against the liberalization
effort.
Finally (fourth), sometjnes the transition between a repressed and
liberalized economy is mismanaged at a macroeconomic level,generating
See Krueger (1978, 1981), LIttle (1982), Mlchaely (1982).additional costs, which can become associated with the liberalization process
itself.
It is clear fromthisdiscussion that the dynamic aspects of
liberalization episodes are extremely important. The transition between a
repressed state and a liberalized economy should be implemented carefully, in
order to avoid the abortion of the liberalization attempt itself. Among these
dynamic aspects, those related to the speed and order of liberalization are
particularly important. With respect to the former, the main question is how
fast should an economy be liberalized? In analyzing this problem considera-
tions related to (a) efficiency gains, (b) income distribution,
Cc)credibilityof the liberalization reforms, and Cd) feasibility of the
attempt should be taken into account.!" Regarding the order of
liberalization, the main question is which markets should be liberalized
first. This is a complicated question that has both micro (welfare) and macro
implications. At the micro level typical second—best problems are present,
while at the macro level, different orders of the liberalization process will
imply different paths f or the critical variables, including the real exchange
rate, aggregate output and unemployment.
The present paper deals with a particular aspect of the order of
economic liberalization: the order of liberalizing the current and capital
account of the balance of payments. It has generally been considered that the
opening of the economy to the rest of the world is an integral part of any
economic reform aiming at increasing the role of markets in LDC's. Until
On the speed of liberalization see Aizenman (1983), Learner (1980), Pindyk
(1982), Krueger (l983b), Mussa (1982, 1983).—14 —
recently,however, very little discussion had been devoted to the order in
which the current and capital accounts should be liberalized. !Therecent
experience of a group of countries from the cone of South—America ——
Argentina,Chile and Uruguay —-hasgenerated new interest on the subject.
These countries followed opposite orders -—Argentinaand Uruguay opened the
capital account first, while Chile opened the current account first —-witha
common fate in the early 1980s: deep economic recession and (partial)rever-
sal of the liberalization attempt. An important policyquestion that has
emerged from these experiences has to do with defining liberalizationpolicy
packages (including a specific order) that would increase thepossibility that
the reforms will indeed be undertaken and will not be reverted.
In the present paper some of the most important issues relatedto the
order of liberalization of the current and capital accounts of thebalance of
payments are surveyed. The paper is organized in the following form: In
Section 2 the literature on the subject is reviewed, andsome interpretations
are suggested. In this section the central role o' credibility inany
successful policy reform is emphasized. In SectIon 3 a positIveanalysis of
the effects of liberalizing the cpital and currnt accountson production and
income distribution Is presented. The framework used for thisdiscussion is a
3 goods—two factors node1 with sector specific capital in theshort-run. This
analysis proceeds with great detail and shows that each reform on Itsown will
tend to have opposite effects on production and income distribution.In
Of course, this question is only relevant in a world with market
imperfections and/or externalities. In a world without externalitiesor
frictions the question of the orders of liberalization Is trivial: all
markets should be liberalized simultaneously and Instantaneously.—5--
Section14 a two—period model of' a small economy is used to investigate the
welfare effects of opening the capital account (i.e., allow some foreign
borrowing or lending) in the presence oftraderestrictions. This discussion
providesa general multi—period framework useful for analyzing the welfare
consequences of partial reforms. It is shown that the welfare effects of
opening the capital account in thepresence oftrade distortions will depend
critically on whether the foreign funds obtainedfrom abroad are used to
(directly)increase present consumption or if they are used to finance capital
accumulation.Finally, in Section 5 asummary and some concluding comments
arepresented. Also in this section some thoughts regarding future lines of
research on the subject are presented.
2.The Order of Economic Liberalization: A Review of the Literature
The order of economic liberalization ——understoodas whether the
capital or the current accounts should be liberalized first -—hasbecome an
explicit topic of analysis only during the last few years. It wasbasically
the recent liberalization and stabilization experience of the countries of the
cone of South-America (Argentina, Chile and Uruguay) that triggered a broad
discussion on the subject. Since 1980 an increasing number of conferences,
papers, Ph.D. theses and research projects have been devoted to the subject. -Y
Eventhough the explicit analysis of the order of liberalization of the
current and capital accounts is only recent, it is possible to find some
important discussions on the topic in some earlier work devoted to other
See, for example, Mckinnon (1932), Blejer and Landau (1984), Corbo and de
Melo (1981), IMF Staff Papers (June 1983), Khan and Zahler (1983), and
Krurnrn(1983).—6—
aspectsof economic liberalization [i.e., McKinnon 1973, Chap. 11; Little,
Scitovsky and Scott 1970, Ch. 10].
The different authors that have analyzed the order of liberalization
have tended to focus on different aspects of the problem. However, in order
to organize this review these arguments will be grouped Into three broad cate-
gories: (a) Macroeconomic Stability and real exchange rate movements;
(b) Welfare effects of alternative orderings; and (C) Costs of the
adj ustment process.
2.1 Macroeconomic Stability and Real Exchange Rate Movements
It has been suggested that the opening of the capital account of the
balance of payments will result, in the short—run, in large destabilizing
capital flows. 21Ifthe capital account Is opened at a stage where the
domestic capital market is still repressed, with Interest rates fixed at arti—
fically low levels, massive capital outflows will take place. For this reason
most, if not all authors that have discussed this issue have suggested that
the capital account should only be opened after the domestic capital market
has been liberalized, and domestic Interest rates have been raised. .!Itis
also generally accepted that in an inflationary environment the domestic
financial market should only be liberalized after the fiscal deficit hasbeen
.1!See,for example, McKinnon (1973, 1982), Dornbusch (1983), Corbo (1983),
Arriazu (1983b), Little, Scitovsky and Scott (1970, Ch. 10, p. 365).
Interestingly,in most of the literature on domestic financial markets
liberalization authors have referred to "raising" interest rates rather
than "freeing" them (see, for exarip1e, Mc}Cinnon's 1973 classical
treatment of the subject).—7-
controlled. The reason for this is that, as emphasized by McKinnon and
Mathiesori[1981], the existence of a large fiscal deficit, which is financed
by an inflation tax, necessitates that reserve requirements are kept highand
interest payments on deposits are kept low. In this way it is assured that
the base on which the inflation tax is collected -—thestock of high powered
money --isnot eroded. J-2!
If,on the other hand, the fiscal deficit has been controlled and the
domestic fInancIal market liberalIzed, the presumption is that the opening of
the capital account of the balance of payments will result in large inflows of
foreign capital, triggered by the existence of substantial interest rates
differentials [see MeKinnon, 1973]. These inflows of foreign funds will then
be monetized and, under a fixed exchange rate will result in inflation and a
real appreciation of the domestic currency.IL"if,onthe other hand, the
country In question chooses to adopt a floating exchange rate, the massive
inflow of capital will result in an appreciation of the nominal (arid real)
2!Most of the discussion on the order of liberalization in the context of
the southern cone countries has focused on the problem of liberalization
with stabilization. The reason for this is, of course, that these
countries attempted to liberalize and reduce extremely high inflation
rates (up to 500% per year) simultaneously.
See McKinnon (1982) and 'IcKinnon and Mathieson (1981) for discussions on
the subject. It has been suggested that the inability to control the
fiscal deficit in Argentila wa ne of the major causes of the failure of
the recent liberalization 4ith stabilization attempted in that country.
See, f or example, Rodriguez (1fl3), Nogues (1983), Fernandez (1983),
Sjaastad (1983), Arriazu (1933) andMcKinnon(1982).
IL!Theimplicit assumption here io rHtasa result of the opening of the
capital account an excess sUp3ly of'moneywill be generated.—8--
exchangerate. Not only will the opening of the capital account generate
a real appreciation of the domestic currency, but since financial markets
adjust fast ——indeedmuch faster than goods markets ——thisreal appreciation
will be quite abrupt [see Frenkel 1982, 1983].
While the opening of the capital account will generate a real
ciation, it has been argued that a successful liberalization of the trade
account will require a real devaluation of the domesticcurrency. This real
depreciation would help the exportables sector to expand as the new structure
of relative prices replaces the old protective structure. If, however,
due to the opening of the capital account this devaluation isprecluded, the
transition in the tradeable goods sector from a protective toa freer envi-
ronment will become more difficult. The appreciation generatedby the opening
of the capital account will tend to squeeze profitability in thetradeable
goods sector at a moment when this sector (or part of it in the import substi-
tution industries) is going through a costly readjustment. -Li"Consequently
some authors have suggested that the capital and current accounts shouldnot
be open simultaneously, and that during the transitionperiod after trade has
been liberalized, capital Inflows should be tightly controlled.It is
On the relationship between capital flows and the realexchange rate In
LDCs see, for example, the discussions in Harberger (1982);Harberger and
Edwards, (1982); Munoz (1982); Diaz—klejancjro (1981); Cline (1983); Calvo
(1982); Corden (1982); Khan and Zahier (1983); Corbo and Edwards(1981);
Corbo (1983); Arriazu (1983b); Van Wijnbergen (1982); and McKinnon(1973,
1976, 1980, 1982).
Li."See,for example, Mckinnon (1973, 1982); Little, Scitovsky and Scott
(1970); Balassa (1976, 1982); Michaely (1982). See, however, the
in Section 14ofthis paper.
114/—Thatis an exchange rate deprotection, a la Corden (1982) will take
place.—9—
interesting to quote what McKinnon wrote on the subject in 1973,since the
hypothetical situation described by him closely reflectssome of the problems
faced by the southern cone countries during their recent(late l9lOs—early
1980s) liberalization efforts:
.unusually large inflows of foreign capital.. .inhibit
the exchange rate to depreciate sufficiently....
[F]reviously protected competing industries, which facea
significant adjustment problem, could have their
difficulties magnified... .[HJence the capital inflow
could trigger a decline Iroveralldomestic
output... (page 160)
McKinnon then goes on to recommend that aneconomy that liberalizes
its foreign trade should "deliberately avoidan unusual or extraordinary
injection of foreign capital" [1973, p. 161, emphasis added].More recently
this kind of reasoning has also been made by Dornbusch[1983], Arriazu [1983],
again by McKinnori [1982], and Harberger [1983]. Thegeneral theme is that
during the transition of a trade liberalizationprocess capital inflows should
be controlled, since otherwise the realexchange rate will appreciate
producing harmful effects, and even destroying theliberalizing experiment.
As Dornbusch [1983, p. 176] has recentlyput it: "The worst thing to do is to
liberalize the capital account.. .before therequired real depreciation has
been achieved".
A critical question regarding this line ofargument is to what extent
the freeing of the capital account will result inan "extraordinary" Injection
of foreign capital, in the sense of the McKinnonquote. If the opening of the
capital account results in large capital inflows whichare sustainable in the
long—run, the resulting appreciation should be vieweda a long—run equilib——1 O-
rium phenomenon. Under those circumstances it isnot clear that the opening
of the capital account should be delayed on thegrounds of its effects on the
real exchange rate. It turns out, however, that it is not difficultto
build simple models of an economy that restrictscapital Inflows, where an
opening of the capital account will result in short-runovershooting of the
level of capital inflows. Possibly one of thesimplest ways of modelling this




where D* is the desired or sustainable level offoreign debt, which will
depend on the level of "the" world interest rate, realIncome, real wealth and
the perceived profitability of investments athome, among other things. D_1
is the actual stock of debt in theprevious period, 0 is a partial adjust-
ment coefficient, and K is the maximum (possiblyzero) amount of (net)
capital inflow allowed by the economic authority Inevery period.
See the discussion in Stockman (1982)on the merits of opening the
capital account as soon as possible.
The term 0[D* -D1]responds to the idea, advanced by Harberger (1982)
for example, that there is a long-runequilibrium ratio of foreign debt
to GDP. If GD? grows at g% per annum so will thestock of debt. If,
on the other hand, the real interest rate on theforeign debt is r*,
net annual capital inflows will grow at a rate of(g —r*).Notice that
a problem with this formulation is that itonly looks at the phase where
foreign debt is accumulated, and does notexplicitly incorporate the
existence of an intertemporal budget constraint.On the different phases
of the accounts of the balance of paymentssee Fischer and Frenkel
(1972).••1 1—
Clearly, if bJC < e(D* —D1)the gap between desired and actual debt will
increase through time. Once the restrictions on capital inflows are lifted,
actual inflows will become equal to O(D* —D1).That means that immediately
following the opening of the capital account capital flows will jump to a
fraction 0 of the accumulated gap between the desired and actual debt. As
this gap is closed, the level of capital inflows will slowly be reduced until
they reach a new equilibrium level. For the case of a simple economy the
behavior through time of capital flows that emerges from this formulationcan
be represented in Figure 2.1. Alternatively, it is possible toassume that
once the capital account Is liberalized the perceived profitability of domes-
tic investrent will dramatically increase [McKinnon, 19733. This willresult
in a (significantly) higher 0* ——sustainablelevel of foreign debt ——andin
a jump In the level of capital inflows, as shown in Figure 2.1.
This sudden increase (i.e., overshooting) of capital inflows will
produce a large current account deficit -—aswas the case of Chile during
1980—1981. .11-" As has been pointed out by McKinnon (1976), Corden (1982)and
Harberger(1982,l983)) among others, as long as a fraction of these flows are
spent on nori-tradeable goods, theabsortjri ofthese capital inflows will
requirean increase In the relative priceof these goods and a real apprecia
tion of domestic currency. Once the gap between desired and actual debt
begins to close, the relative price of riorl—tradeables will slowly tend to
See Harberger (1982), Corbo (1933),. Edwards (198k). See alsoNogues (1983) and Rodriguez (1983) ror a discussion of the Argentinian case.
Harberger (1982) actually caloulated that the increase in the level of
capitalinflows inChile is capable of "explaining" a real appreciation
of the peso of up to 25 percent.—12—
decline towards its new long—run equilibrium. At this point of theadjustment
process another problem may emerge if the country has fixed its exchange
rate: If f or some reason -—theexistence of minimum wages, or of backward
indexation, f or example —-thenominal price of non—tradeables is Inflexible
downward, the decline of this relative price will not occur, andunemployment
will result.
It Is interesting to notice that the dynamic effect ofa capital
account liberalization on the relative price of nontradeablegoods resembles
thatof the Dutch—Disease, in that in order to adjust to a large increasein
absorption a real appreciation of the domestic currency will have to take
place. !2/Also,it should be pointed out that there are other reasons
besides the "jump" in the level of capital flows discussedabove, why the
opening of the capital account could result in a short-run appreciation of the
domestic currency that will exceed the long—run appreciation. One ofsuch
cases is related to the difference between short— and long—run elá$ticitiesof
supply of the nontradeables goods sector.
The conflicting movements of the real exchange rateas a result of
opening the capital or current accounts (i.e.,realappreciation and depre-
ciation respectively)captures the fact that these policies will exercise
pressuresfor resources to move in opposite directions. Theopening of the
capital account will generate (at least in the short—run) anexpansion
of the nori—tradeable goods sector and a contraction of theimportables and
!21OnDutch-Disease see, for example, Corden (1981, 1982), Corden andNeary (1982), Harberger (1982), Edwar'd.3 and Aoki (1983), VanWinjbergen (l98i4a,b).—13—
exportablessectors. The opening of the current account, on the other
hand, will result in an expansion of the exportables sector, a contraction of
the production of Importables, with the nontradeables sector either expanding
or contracting [see the discussion in Section 3 below]. To the extent that
there could be advisable to implement policies that would avoid unnecessary
resource switches (I.e., resource movements that will be reversed after a
short period of time). .-i_"Inparticular a synchronization of the effects of
opening the capital and current accounts, in the sense suggested by Frenkel
[1982, 1983] might be called for. Frenkel has proposed that given the
differential speeds at which the goods and capital markets adjust, this
synchronizationcould be achieved byopening the current account first, and
onlyaftersome time opening the capital account. In Section 3 below, a
specific analysis of the effects of both types of liberlization, that spells
out the difference between short- and long—run effects on resource movements
is presented.
An alternative view has been recently presented by Deepak Lal
[1982]. According to Lal, sInce exchange rate behavior is critIcal during the
transition period from a protected towards a liberalized trade account, it is
better not to let the government manipulate the nominal exchange rate during
this transition. There have been plenty of cases, he argues, where exchange
This indeed has been the case in countries that have opened the capital
account. In Chile, for example, after the capital account was opened in
1979/80, an important fraction of the massive capital inflows was used to
finance the expansion of the construction sector. This was also the case
of Argentina and Uruguay (see Nogues 1983; Hanson and de Melo 1983).
A critical question at this stage is why wouldn't the private sector take
into account these considerations when making their decisions about





rate management has been inappropriateandhas resulted inthe trade reform
being finally aborted (i.e., the recent experience ofArgentina). -?_?JFor
this reason Lal has proposed that a floatingexchange rate system with full
currencyconvertibility, shouldbe implemented beforethe trade reform takes
place. This, of course, means that the capital accountshould be liberalized
before the trade account. A problem with thisproposition however is that Lal
does not spell out how to handle the realappreciation problem resulting from
the opening of the capital account —-eventhough admittedly its effects will
be less severe if the trade side has not beenreformed yet, nor does he
specify how much in advance the capital account should beopened. Also, in
his discussion on the subject Lal does not referto the Institutional setting
that would be required for a floatingexchange rates system to succeed in a
developing country.
2.2 Welfare Effects of AlternativeOrderings
A second line of argument used in discussionsrelated to the ordering
of economic liberalization refers to traditionalwelfare analysis. It has
Other authors that discuss how to handle theexchange rate during the
transition period after a trade reform include McKinnon(1973), Kapur
(1983), Michaely (1982), Balassa (1982). Onepossible way to deal with theexchange rate problem during the transition is toadopta dual
system, with a fixed (or managed) rate for tradetransactions, and a
floating rate for financial transactions. Theproblem with this kind of
system, however, is that it becomes verycumbersome and difficultto
manage. On dual exchange rate systems see, forexample, Meade (1951, p.
302); Flood (1978); Lainy (1975, Fleming (1974)and Dornbusch (1976).
On thi8, see however, Branson (1983).
Some authors have argued that due to the lackof some basic institutional
requirements (freely) floating exchange ratessystems are not feasible In
developing countries. See, for example McKinnon (l979a,b).—16—
been argued that if the current andcapitalaccounts arenotliberalized
simultaneously there might be welfare implications of reducing one distortion
while other distortions are kept In place. This kind of argument has been
made by Frenkel [1982, 1983], Krueger [1983] and McKinnon [1973]. These
authors have generally concluded that welfare considerations indicate that the
current account should be liberalized first. The main reason for this is that
the(negative) indirect welfare effect of opening the capital account in the
presence of trade distortions will exceed the indirect effects arising from
the opposite ordering. MeKinnon [1973, P. 157], forexample stated that "the
liberalization [of] capital inflow[s]. .. increase[s]the basic distortion in
the economy". Frenkel [1983], has expressed that
when the trade account is opened first the cost of remaining
distortion (i.e., the closed capital account)...is likely to
be relatively small. On the other hand, when the capital
account is opened up first the cost of the remaining distor-
tion (i.e., the close trade account)...is likely to bevery
large. Thus a comparison of the costs of distortions...
supports the proposition that the trade account should be
opened first. [p. 167].
Kruger [1983] has stated that
Since exchanges of assets are exchanges of capitalized values
of income streams, income streams generated by distorted
prices are probably the inappropriate ones at which to
trade. It would then follow that capital account libera—
lization should not be undertaken unless both current account
anddomestic financial transaction are already
liberalized. [P. 19].
Insome sense this type of reasoning, which focuses on the welfare
effects of opening the capital account in the presence of tradedistortions,
As mentioned in the introduction, in a world with no distortions the
Optimal (i.e., welfare maxirnizing) strategy is to liberalize both accounts
simultaneouslyand instantaneously.—17—
canbe related to the irnnilserizing capital accumulation argument originally
advanced by Harry Johnson [1967]. ?_"Thisargument points out that if there
are tariffs and the importable goods is capital Intensive, capital accumula-
tion may be welfare reducing. The reason for this is that when capital is
accumulated, production of the capital Intensive (i.e., the importable) sector
will increase, [Rybczynskl 1955], and the effect of the pre—existing distor-
tion will be reinforced. This effect can be strong enough, so that the accu-
mulation of capital will result in a reduction of welfare. An obvious
question at this point Is why would the recipients of capital inflows use them
to accumulate capital (i.e., to invest) if welfare might be reduced? The
answeris that while from a private perspective the accumulation ofcapital
maybebeneficial, since under our assumptions regarding capital intensity,
the domestic rental rate of capital will exceed the world rental rate,
from a social perspective, it will be less desirable —-andcould even he
immiserizing. This suggests, then, that if once the capital account is opened
investment decisions are made using shadow prices, welfare will never decrease
[see Edwards and Van Wijnbergen 1983].
Of course, irnmiserization represents an extreme case. However, the
analytics of this case can be applied to more plausible results, where the
increase in welfare resulting fron capital accumulation is lower in the
presence of trade distortion. See also Bertrand and Flatters (1971) for
extensions on the welfare efrects of the accumulation of capital.
The condition for this welfare reduction to take place is that the
Rybczynski line is flatter' than tie world's relative price line. See
Johnson (1967).
This,of course, according to Solper-Sarnuelson's theorem.—18—
The analysis of the welfare effects of foreign investment in the
presence of tariffs ——asdeveloped by Bhagwati and Srinivasan [1982], and
Brecher and Diaz—Alejandro [1977], among others ——canalso be useful for the
present discussion regarding the order of liberalization. Brecher and Diaz-
Alejandro, for example, have shown that in the presence of tariffs if the
importable goods is capital Intensive a small amount of foreign investment
will always be welfare reducing if foreign capital is paid its marginal
product. This will happen even If the conditions required for the Johnson
[1967] immiserlzation discussed above, do not hold. If, however, the return
to foreign capital is taxed, foreign investment may be welfare improving.
They argue that if the amount of this tax Is equal to the difference between
capital's marginal productivity valued at domestic prices, and capital's
marginal productivity valued at world prices, welfare will remain unaffec-
ted. Again, the main reason for this result lies on the fact that under the
assumption that the importable goods is capital Intensive foreign investment
—-orfor that matter any form of capital accumulation ——willresult in an
increase in the production of the sector that already produces too much from a
social perspective.
In general, the welfare effects of additional investment resulting
from the liberalization of the capital account can be analyzed within the
context of the emerging literature on factor trade. If before the
liberalization process the (private) domestic rate of return to capital
exceeds the world rate of return, once foreign borrowing is allowed some of
On factor trade see, for example, Grossman (1983), Bhagwati and Srinivasan
(1983), Brecher and Findlay (1983), Brecher (1983) and Srinivasan (1983).—19—
thesefundswillbe used for the importation of machines. Analytically this
is equivalent to allowing trade in machines (today), and thus can be analyzed
withinthe factor trade framework.
The above discussion -—and,to some extent, the argument of MeKinnon
[1973], Frenkel [1982, 1983] and Krueger [1983] presented above ——focus
exclusively on the case where, as a result of the liberalization of the
capital account, the additional borrowing is used to increase investment.
This, of course, needs not be the case. A fraction (possibly zero) of the new
borrowing could be used to increase present consumption. Indeed that will
happen as long as prior to the liberalization the domestic rate of time
preferences exceeded the world rate of interest. It is easy to show that,
underthesecircumstances, if all of the (new) foreign borrowing is used for
additional present consumption (with the world rate of interest below the
domestic rate of time preferences) welfare cannot deteriorate even if there
are tariff's.
We now briefly turn to discuss the welfare effect of liberalizing
trade in the presence of a closed capital account. The question here is if
there arecircumstarices urder whiô'n this particular order of liberalization
will result in some indirect negative welfare effects. In principle, at a
theoretical level, it is conceivable that some models might yield this kind of
result. Specifically, if the restricitons In the capital account take the
form of a tax on foreign borrowing that introduces a wedge between the world
and domestic rates of interest, and the liberalization of the current account
A different, and more relevant question of course, is whether the total -—
directplus indirect effects --canbe negative.—20—
results In a reduction (i.e., leftward shift) of the dnand for foreign
borrowing, an indirect negative welfare effect could result.
In practice, however, this case is quite Implausible. First, It is
unlikely that the reduction of tariffs will generate a reduction of the demand
for foreign borrowing. The reason for this is that once tariffs are reduced
the demand for importables will increase, with part of the Increase in con-
sumption of this type of goods being financed by additional foreign borrow-
ing. Second, In a large number of cases the distortions associated with
capital account take the form of quantitative restrictions, where a given
maximum amount of foreign borrowing is allowed. In this case then, there is
no indirect welfare cost (i.e., welfare rectangle), in the borrowing market
associated with the reduction of trade distortions. In general, these
considerations constitute a part of the presumption that trade liberalization
is welfare improving even if distortions in some other markets are maintained
EKrueger 1983; Michaely 1982; Corbo and de Melo 1981].
2.3 Adjustment Costs and Assistance
Some authors have postulated that in order to increase the
probability of success (i.e., non—reversal) of a trade reform, the adjustment
costs (unemployment and others) related to the tariffs reduction should be
il-'1Thereis an important problem, however, related to the speed of tariff
reductions. it is conceivable that if a slow tariff reform schedule is
announced today, borrowing will decrease, since the public will postpone
consumption towards the future, when tariffs will be lower.-21 -
minimized[see for example Michaely, 1982].i!Ithas then been argued that
one way of reducing these adjustmentcosts is through the importation of
foreign capital, which would be used tofinance a smoother adjustment of the
import competing industries. Accordingto this view then, the capital account
shouldbe opened first, or simultaneouslywith the trade account. This would
increasethe availability of "cheap" funds that could thenbe used to ease the
adjustment process. Paul Clark [1982], for example, arguesthat the success-
fulliberalization ofthe Egyptian economy in the 1970s was due, to a large
extent,to the adjustment assistance provided by foreignsources. Anne
Krueger [1983a] on the other hand, whilenot agreeing with the order "capital
account firstand trade—account second", has also recognized the possible
importantrole of foreignfunds tohelpachieve a smoother transition. Asshe
putsit:
[O]ne of the important contributions international lending can
make to a country when its leaders are genuinelycommitted to full
liberalization, [is to].. .permit higher levels of importsthan
would otherwise be feasible....Not only does thisreduce the
economic and political strains associated withliberalization, it
also reduces uncertainty of business as to thelikelihood that
liberalization will persist. [1983a, p. 11].
The arguments for using foreign funds tosmooth the adjustment
processduring a trade liberalization episode are, to someextent, equivalent
Usually the idea of' minimizing adjustment costsis translated into two
forms of policy recorarnentations:(1) liberalization of trade should be
done slowly [see Michaely 1982; Little, Scltovsky, Scott,1970); and
(b) adjustment assistance —--usuallyin the form of foreign funds —-
shouldbe provided.
See also, for example, Little, Scitovsky and Scott (1970,Ch. 10);
Michasly (1982, p. 17).—22—
to the arguments in favor of providing adjustment assistance to industries
that arenegatively affected by (exogenous) changes In the terms of trade. A
recent NBER study edited by Jagdlsh Bhagwatl [1982] contains a number of
interesting papers on the subject. As Bhagwati himself puts it in the
introduction to this volume, the analysis of the adjustment assistance issue
requires knowing the path the economy will take following the change of rela-
tive prices (i.e., changes in terms of trade and/or tariff reductions).
According to the simple textbook case, following a change in relative prices,
resources will immediately move out of the sector whose relative price has
declined and into the expanding sector. In more complex models however, there
will be adjustment costs and resource reallocation will only take place
slowly, and will possibly result in a short—run loss of output. However,
it is very important to clearly specifythenature of these adjustment costs
before making inferences regarding the desirability of intervention. If these
costs are related to the activity of moving resources between sectors, as in
Mussa's [1978] model, and there are no externalities, there is no welfare—
related reason to provide adjustment assistance. If, on the other hand,
adjustment costs arise from market imperfections ——likethe existence of
minimum wages for example --thereis some room for intervention. The first
best policy, of course, is to try to eliminate the source of these market
11"See,for example, Bruno (1932), ieary (1982), and Mussa (1982).
The most popular models wit-i adjustment costs are of the Ricardo-Viner
type. See for example Jones (197L), Mayer (19724), Mussa (19711, 1978,
1982), Neary (1978, 1982), and Jtit and Norman (1980).
However, adjustment assistance mIght be called for other reasons, like
income distribution consider'.3tIn. See Learner (1981).—23—
imperfections. If, for whatever reason, this first bestpolicy is not
available, second best solutions should be sought.
McKinnorj [1973, 1982], however, has stronglyopposed the idea of
using foreign capital flows to assist the trade reform transitionperiod. In
fact, in his 1973 book he characterized aborted liberalizationepisodes as
"partial liberalization with foreign capital" [1973,p. 155]. This view,
which is consistent with his position oftightly controlling capital inflows
throughout the trade liberalization, is based on the idea thatshort—term
capital movements provide incorrect signals to theprivate sector:
[T]rade liberalization should proceed withoutrelying on
unusual short—term inflows of private oapital...Suchcapital
inflows are simply not sustainable In thelong—run; and during
the liberalization process itself they throw outincorrect
market signals. [1982, p. 163]
There are two problems with this view. First, itis not clear what
is meant by "unusual" inflows of capital.Second, there is no theoretical a
priori reason to believe that these "unusual" capital inflowswill provide the
wrong signals. In order for this argument to make sense it Isnecessary to
explicitly specify why the private sector will not realize (asthe government
presumably does in McKinnon' model) that these inflowsaretemporaryand
"unusual". If, on the other hand, the private sectordoes realize the
temporary nature of the inflows, they will not throw incorrectsignals and
there is no reason, at least on these gounds, torestrict capital movements.
A critical question regarding thisproblem is related to the
credibilit1 of the trade reform. If the public believes that there issome
probability that the reform willbereversed inthefuture, foreign funds,
obtainedthrough the opening of the capital account,may be used by the owners—214-
of capital in the Import substitution industries to maintain their firms
functioning at a (temporary) loss. Alternatively, these funds could be used
to finance lobbying activities aimed at convincing the government officials of
the desirability of reversing the trade reform. .31-"
Also,If agents believe that the trade reform will be reversed, they
will tend to borrow heavily today, in order to finance a higher present con-
surnption. This, of course, is a rational strategy if it is expected that
(importable) goods in the future will be more expensive, due to the perceived
hike of tariffs. This optimal behavior from a private perspective, however,
may result in excessive (i.e., non—optimal) borrowing from the social point of
view.
The above discussion suggests that depending on the degree of credi—
bilty a larger availability of foreign funds may either help the adjustment
process -—bymaking it politically more pallatable as Krueger suggests -—or
may frustrate the whole experience. However, the degree of credibility --
whichis critical for the analysis of the order of,liberalization -—should
not be viewed as an exogenous variable. On the contrary, the strategy
followed during the liberalization process will affect the degree of credibi—
lity. If the economic reforms are pursued in a way such that credibility is
low, agents will not make the required adjustments and the likelihood of
failure of the economic reform will be high. In that sense, a fundamental and
critical aspect of establishing credibiiity is related to the Internal consis—
.31."AsCarlos Rodriguez (1983) has documented it, this was the recent case of
Argentina.-25—
tencyof the policies being pursued. In that respect, for example, the
inconsistency of the Argentinian fiscal policy —-whichmaintained a very
large fiscal deficit ——andthe pre—announced exchange rate policy severely
undermined the degree of credibility of the whole reform package.
2.11 Summary
In this section the literature on the order of economic liberali-
zation has been reviewed and discussed. The discussion has basically abstrac-
ted from th relationship between liberalization and stabilization (see
however the brief discussion in Section 5 of this paper) and has focused on
different arguments used to suggest a specific ordering for liberalizing the
capital and the current accounts of the balance of payments. It is important
to emphasize that a large part of this literature has asked the following
question: given that the liberalization of the trade account (I.e., the
dismantlement of QR's and reduction of tariffs) is a policy objective, should
the capital account be opened simultaneously, or only after tariffs have been
reduced? In that sense, then, the existing literature has focused on a
narrower question than the one addressed here.
In this section the arguments that have appeared in the (brief)
literature on the subject were organized into three broad categories:
(a) macroeconomic stability and real exchange rate movements;(b) welfare
effects of alternative orderings and (c) adjustment costs and assistance.
On problems of credibility in the context of' anti—inflationary policy see
Schelling (1982), Taylor (1982) and Fellner (1982).
See Sjaastad (1983) for an illustration of the degree of inconsistency of
these policies using an inflation tax view.—26—
An interesting policy question related to the order of liberalization
advocated by MoKinnon, Frenkel and others —-"currentaccount first" -—stems
from the recent Chilean experience. Chile followed almost exactly the
McKlnnon-Frenkel order, liberalizing the trade account first and only after
tariffs had reached their final goal of 10%, partially opening the capital
account. 9_"However,the Chilean economy recently entered Into the worst
recession in its history with real output declining by 15% in 1982. While a
complete analysis of the Chilean experience is well beyond the scope of the
present paper, .J_"itis possible to point out some of the major causes of the
the Chilean crisis. First, the adoption of a fixed exchange rate to the
dollar (In June 1979), at the same time as real wages were fully indexed
created serious policy inconsistencies. The pegging of the peso, in the
presence of massive capital inflows in 1980 and 1981 resulted in a real appre-
ciation of the Chilean peso of almost 30%, which was translated into an
important loss of competitiveness of the tradeables goods sector. This situa-
tion was aggravated by the presence of extremely high real rates of interest
--partiallygeneratedby generalized expectations of a large devaluation --,
thewoi'ld reöessiOn, and the decline in Chile's terms of trade. The failure
to take corrective policy measures in time aggravated the situation, generat-
ing speculation against the peso, with the consequent loss of international
reserves.
Mckinnon (1982, p. 159) states that "The correct order of
liberalization.. .approxirnates the successful Chilean experience after
1975. Chile is to be treated as a norm or standard of reference."
On the recent Chilean experience see Harberger (1982), Corbo (1983),
Edwards (1981, 1985a) and Sjaastad (1983).—27—
The Chilean experience indicates the macroeconomic management
following a liberalization attempt is much more difficult than what it has
been thought. Also, this case confirms the central role of expectations and
credibility in any major economic reform. If credibility is low, and there
are expectations of policy reversal, it will be very difficult for the reform
to succeed. Since, as it was argued above, expectations and credibility are
largely endogenous, one of the considerations that should be taken into
account when formulating the reform policy is to set the speed and ordering of
the liberalization in a way such that these expectations of reversal will be
low.
An important problem related to the opening of the capital account,
which has not received the attention it deserves has to do with the level of
foreign indebtedness resulting from the opening process. The main
question here is to what extent can a liberalization of the capital account
result in a foreign debt crisis because the private sector over—borrows? In
principle, it could be argued that this is unlikely, since the private sector,
which now faces the "correct" signals, will take loans only if the marginal
return obtained from those funds exceeds the cost of the loans. Theoreti-
cally, in the simplest class of models, the free interaction between the
Of course, this is more easily said than done. The role of policy
credibility is clearly one or the nore important topics of macroeconomic
research at the moment. Some early and promising contributions on the
subject include Taylor (1982), Schelling (1982) and Fellrier (1982).
Mcklnnon (1973), however, briefly rentions this problem in his taxonomy of
the successful and unsuccessful Leralization attempts.—28—
privatedomestic sector and the foreign banks will result in an optimal
borrowing/lending strategy. From a practical point of view and in more
sophisticated models, however, there are a number of reasons to believe that
this will not be the case. First, as the recent experience of some Latin—
American countries has shown, the distinction between private and public
foreign debt is highly artificial. Once a country's private sector runs into
debt problems, the government takes over (or is forced to take over) this
private debt. Thismeans that to the extent that the private sector knows
that it will be bailed out by the government, the possibility of moral hazard
type of behavior becomes highly likely. Under these circumstances, there will
be an important difference between socially and privately optimal borrowing
strategies, with a tendency on behalf of the private sector to over-borrow.
Second, contrary to the textbook case, even small countries cannot borrow
infinite amounts at "the" given world rate of interest. Quite the contrary,
even small countries face (up to a certain point) upward sloping supplies of
foreign funds, where the Interest rate charged is an increasing function of
the amount borrowed. This fact also suggests that the private sector will
tendtoover-borrow once the capital account Is opened. Specifically, there
is an argument for Imposing an optimal tax on borrowing at a rate of
1/c, where c is the elasticity of supply of foreign funds. And third, If
the private sector expects that the trade reform will be reversed In the
See, for example, Diaz—Alejandro (1983).
See McDonald (1982) for an exhaustive review of issues related to country
risk. See also Edwards (19814) and Harberger (1976, 1980).—29—
future (i.e., that tariffs will be raised), they will perceive a very low
consumptioninterestrate (measuredas therate at which they can exchange
traded goods between today and tomorrow) today, and will thus tend to increase
its foreign borrowing. While this is a perfectly optimal strategy from
the private point of view itmaynot be sofroma social perspective.
3.Pricesand Resource Movements During Capital and Current Account
Liberal izat ion
The purpose ofthissection is to set up an analytical framework for
analyzingthe process of' economic liberalization in a small economy. The
discussion will focus ontwodifferent aspects of economic liberalization:
(a) the liberalization of foreign trade, and (b) the liberalization of'
capitalflows (i.e., allowing foreign borrowing), and will emphasize price and
resource movements during the liberalization episode. The analysis presented
here islargelypositive and develops a model of a simplified economy, with
three goods and two factors. The discussion traces in detailhow both reforms
willaffect prices, resource movements and production in the short and long-
run. The analysis islargelybased on the extension of the Viner—Ricardo
model for the case of three goods as presented by Corden and Neary (1982).
The model used assumes that there is no capital accumulation. For this
reason, the analysis of the effects of opening the capital account is somewhat
simplified, since it assumes that all funds obtained from abroad are used to
increase present consumption. However, the framework presented here can be
See Dornbusch (l983b) for a discussion on the subject. See also Martin
andSelowsky (19814).—30—
also used to deal with the more general case where capital accumulation is
also allowed.
The main objective of the analysis presented here is to provide a
clear picture of the real consequences of the process of economic libera—
lization, Including changes in production and in income distribution. At the
risk of being repetitive, the analysis proceeds slowly, trying to make clear
every Important step in the chain of events that follows aliberalization
episode. The model developed In this section shows that as a result ofeach
of these reforms on their own resources and production will tend to move in
opposite directions. Also the effects on Income distribution of both reforms
will be the opposite. While a trade reform (i.e. the removal of tariffs) will
result In resources moving into the exportables sector; the opening of the
capital account will result in resources moving out of that sector. To the
extent that resource movements involve some costs, this fact suggests that
from a policy perspective some efforts should be made to coordinate the real
effects of the two reforms. A general principle that should be considered
when deterrniing the order of these two reforms in that the (unnecessary)
reversal of reéource movements should be avoided. Then, the opening of
the two account should be synchronized in a way such that resources do not
move in and out of a sector in a short period of time, since the economywill
incuranunnecessary cost.
In Section II, however, a nore general model that allows for foreignfunds
to be used bothto increase present consumption and to accumulate capital
ispresented.
It is important to note that in the real world this should be only one of'
the principles used for determining the correct ordering. Others --not
mentioned in this section due to the nature of the model -—referto
issues related to credibility and continuity of the reform.—31 —
3.1The Economy Under Consideration
Assume the case of a small country that produces three goods:
exportables CX), importables (M) and non—tradeables(N). Production is
carried out using capital arid labor. Production functions have the conven-
tional properties and it is assumed that in the short-run capital issector—
specific, with labor being perfectly mobile between the threesectors.
Imports are initially subject to a tariff, and external borrowingis
not allowed. With respect to the labor market, it will be assumed thatit is
free of distortions. However, the consequences of assuming the existenceof
an economy wide minimum wage, which is binding in the short-run,will also be
investigated. The domestic capital market is free of distortions,with the
rental rates of capital being equalized in the long—run, across sectors.
Regarding factor intensity, it will be assumed that importableshave the
highest capital/labor ratio. With respect to exportablesand non—tradeables,
alternative assumptions regarding factor intensities will be brieflydiscussed
in sub—section 3.2.1.
! riticai assumption made in this section is that there is no capi-
tal acóumulation and, consequently, one international borrowing is allowed,the
proceeds of foreign loans are fully used to Increase present consumption.
In that sense, then, it is assumed that at the initial point the rateof' time
preference exceeds "the" world rate of interest. The analysis presented
On sector—specific models see, for example, Jones 1971; Mayer 19714; Mussa
l97, 1978, 1982; Neary 1978a,b, 1982.
In that sense, then, this analysis from the possibility of negative
welfare effects of allowing foreign investment in the presenceof'
tariffs. On this, however, see Section 14 of this paper.—32-
herealso assumes that there is no initial inflation, andthattariff proceeds
are returned to consumers in a nondistorting lump—sum fashion. These two
assumptions represent a simplification of the real world characteristics of
countries that have embarked in liberalization attempts. As has been pointed
out by Krueger (1981), (1983) and Little (1982), among others, most
liberalization attempts by developing countries have started from crises
situations with high inflation. However, by ignoring inflation in the present
section, it is possible to focus on issues related to liberalization,
abstracting from those of stabilization. On the relationship between stabili-
zation and liberalization, however, see Krueger (1981). See also Section 6 of
this paper.
3.2 Trade Liberalization
In this section the effects of reducing (eliminating) tariffs in a
three—goods small economy areinvestigated.It is assumed, for analytical
convenience, that initially there are no quantitative restrictions (or that
they have been already replaced by tariffs), and that the exchange rate is
fixed and equal to one. It is also assumed that capital is sector specific in
the short-run,while itcan freely move between sectors in the long—run. The
discussionwill first deal with long—run effects, then, the short—run effects
and the transition towards the long-run will be discussed. The analysis will
concentrateon thebehavior of good prices, factors rewards (i.e., income
distribution) and production. tt ts assumed that while all prices are
flexiblein the long-run, some or tnen (i.e., wages) may herigidin the
short—run.—33—
3.2.1LongRun Effects of Trade Liberalization
Inthis class ofmodelsof a small economy with three goods (import—
ables, exportablesand non—tradeables), two factors (capital aridlabor), and
the usual competition assumptions, long—run domestic prices are fully deter-
mined (under non—specialization) by world prices, technology and tariffs.
Equilibrium can be described in the following way: world prices of export—
ables and importables (plus the tariff) determine the rewards to both factors
of production; these rewards, on their turn and under the assumption ofcompe-
tition, determine the price of non-tradeables. Demand considerations f or non-
tradeables determine total output of non—tradeables and total factors used In
their production. This leaves a certain amount of factors that Is used in the
production of exportables and Importables In a traditional Hecksher-Ohlln
(11—0) fashion.
In the rest of the analysis the price of exportables will be taken to
be the numeraire (i.e., P =1).Consider now the effect of a reduction
(elimination) of the level of the import tariff on the relative prices of
final goods and on factors rewards. This effect will basically depend on the
assumptions made regarding factor intensities. Two cases will be considered
here: Case 1 assumes (K/L) < (K/L) < (K/L)M; while Case 2 assumes (K/L)N
< (K/L) < (K/L)M.
Consider first Case 1, where imports are assumed to have the highest.
capital labor ratio with exports having the lowest. The effect of a reduction
of the taritf on factor rewards and the relative price of non—tradeables
can be analyzed using Figure 3.1, which is the dual to the well—known Lerner-
Pearce diagram. The initial equilibrium is given by the Intersection of the—3±' —
threeis000st3 MM, XX and NN. These curves present the cnbinations of
wages andrental rates of capital that result in a constantcost of producing
these goods at the existing technology [see Mussa, 1979]. The slopes of these
curves areequalto the capital labor ratio, and asmay be seen in Figure 3.1,
correspond to the assumptions of Case 1. Initially equilibrium is obtained
atA with a wage rate (relative to exports) equal to and a rental rate
equal to r0.
The reduction of the Imports tariff will result in a leftward shift
of the MM curve towards M'M'. The reason for this is that now, in order to
rnanitain equilibrium between domestic costs and the world price of' import-
ables, plus the tariff, lower canbinations of wages and rental rates will be
required. New long—run equilibrium will be obtained at B where the new
M'M' curve intersects the XX curve. As the Stolper—Samuelson theorem indi-
cates, the reduction of the import tariff in an economy where exportables are
labor intensive, will result in higher wages and lower rental rates (i.e.,
> W0, and r1 < r0).
The new equilibrium point B is below the NN isôcost,indicating
that as a consequence of the tariff reduction the price of non—tradeables in
terms of exportables will nave to fall. This conclusion, of course, will not
hold under Case 2, where non-tradeables are more labor intensive than export-
ables. In that case the intersection of the XX and M'M' curves will be












tradeables sector their relative price will have to increase. In order
to simplify the discussion, through the rest of this paper we will focus on
Case 1, [(K/L) < (K/L), < (K/L)M].
While the long-run (relative) price of non—tradeables is completely
determined by technological considerations, the amountproducedof this type
ofgoods will also depend on the demand side. In particular, production of
Nwill be such that, atthe prevailing prices, the non—tradeables market
clears. The production side of the model can be analyzed using a three goods
Edgeworth—Bowley box asdevelopedby Melvin (1968). Figure 3.2 illustrates
the case where exportables are the most labor intensive good. [See Corden and
Neary(1982)for an application of this diagram to a Dutch—disease type of
analysis.] In this diagramnon-tradeablesIsoquants are drawn from origin
At the Initial prices the non-tradeable goods market clears at a level of
production given by isoquant MN0. The capital—labor ratio in non—tradeables
productionis given by the slope of 0N0M• Production of exportables
measuredfrom O, and that of importables by distance OMR. In equilibrium
the slope of MN0 Isoquant at °Mequalsthe slopes of the corresponding
isoquants for exportables and importablès, which are tangent at R.
The discussion regarding factor rewards and relative prices (Figure
3.1) showed that the reduction of the tariff will generate, in the long-run,
an increase in the wage rate relative to the rental rate. That means that all
three sectors will now become more capital intensive. This Is shown in
Notice then that theoretically depending on the assumptions regarding
capital-labor intensity the real-exchange rate, defined is the domestic








Figure 3.3, where the dashed rays depict the new (after tariff reduction)
capital/labor ratios. However, in order to determine the new equilibrium it
is necessary to know what will happen to the demand of non-tradeables, as a
consequence of the tariff reduction.
Assume first, in order to organize the discussion,that the quantity
demanded for non—tradeables does not change after the imports tariffs are
reduced. This assumption will be relaxed later. In this case, the new
equilibrium point in production of non-tradeables will be obtained at the
intersection of the new (higher) capital-labor ratio and the initial NN0
isoquant, at point O. Production of importables will be reduced to OAT,
andproduction of exportables will increase to MxT. This result was obtained
under the assumption that the quantity demanded of non—tradeables was not
affected bythereduction of tariffs. In general, however, this will not be
thecase. Moreover, given our assumptions regarding capital/labor intensity,
it is expected that the demand f or non—tradeables will increase as a result of
the liberalization. The reasons for this are two: (a) As shown in Figure
3.1, after the liberalization of trade the (relative) price of nori—tradeables
will decline, producing a substitution effect in demand towards non—trade—
ables; and(b) the trade liberalization will generate a positive incane
effect, as national income at international prices increases, which will also
have a positive effect on the quantity demanded of N. If the demand for non—
tradeables increases, long—run equilibrium in Figure 3.3 will be on the new
capital—labor ratio ray to the left of the NN isocost. In terms of Figure
3.3 this new equilibrium is obtained at O, with production of exportables
being equal to OS, production of imnportables havingbeen reduced to OS






Insummary,under Case 1 capital intensity assumptions, the long—run
effects ofa tariff reduction will be:
(i) Prices of nori—tradeables, relative to exportables will fall.
(ii) Wages, relative to all goods, will increase.
(iii) The rental rate of capital, relative to all goods,will
decrease.
(iv) Production of exportables will expand.
(v) Production of non—tradeables will expand.
(vi) Production of Importables will decline.
3.2.2 Short—Run Effects
This section investigates the short—run effects of a tariffreduction
under the Case I assumptions about capital labor intensity.It is assumed
thatin the short—run capital is sector specific, while labor cart movefreely
across sections. The representation used in this model,then, is an adapta-
tion for a three goods case of the Virier—Ricardo modelsof Jones (1971), Mayer
(1974) and Mussa (19714).[Seethe paper by Corden and Neary 1982, for an
application of this kind of model.]
The initial equilibrium situation can be illustrated using Figure
3.4,whichis adapted from Mussa (19714) for the case of the three goods.In
this figure, the horizontal axis measurestotallabor available in the
economy, while the vertical axis depicts the wagerate in terms of export—
ables. LT is the denand for labor by the tradeable goods sectorsand is
equal to the (horizontal) sum of the demand for labor bythe exportable sector
(which is given by In this rigure) and the demand for labor of the
icnportables sector. on the other hand is the demand for labor of the non-—In —
tradeablegoods sector. The initial equilibrium is characterized, then, by a
wage rate equal to W0, with OTLA labor used in the production of
exportables, LALB labor used in the production of importables and OLB used
in the production of rion—tradeables.
There are several differences between this short—run model and the
long—run model discussed in the previous sub—section. FIrst, since capital Is
now sector specific, the direct link between tradeable goods prices and fac-
tors rewards is broken. For this reason Stolper—Samuelson theorem does not
hold (in the short—run), and the price of non—tradeables will be determined by
the Intersection of the demand and supply schedules for these kind of goods.
The strategy Is now to analyze the short-run effects of trade liberalization
on prices, production, resource movements and income distribution, (i.e.,
factor rewards). This analysis is then combined with the long—run results
alreadydiscussed in the previous section to find out the characteristics of
thetransition, in away similar to that proposed by Peter Neary (1978).
Inthe short run, the reduction of the tariff, under the assumption
of sector—specific fact'ors, will generate changes both In the (relative) price
of importables and non—tradeable￿ (see, for example, Dornbusch 19714, 1980).
While the price of importables will unambiguously fall, the behavior of the
price of non-tradeables will depend on the assumption regarding substitu-
tability and the magnitude or the income effects. Assuming that the three
goods aregrosssubstitutes in consumption and production, and that the income
effect does not exceed the substitution effect, it can be shown that as a
result of the reduction of the tarirf' the price of non—tradeables will fall












Thereduction in the level of the tariff will reduce the domestic
price of importables, generating a downward shift of the LT curve(with
theLx curve con8tant). In Figure 3—5 the new LT curve will intersect
the LN curve at R. However, this is not a final equilibrium situation,
since, as already discussed the tariff reduction will also result In a decline
in the price of non—tradeables (relative to exports). As a consequence, LN
will shift downward (by less than LT) and final short-run equilibrium will
be achieved at S. In this new equilibrium, production of exportables has
Increased -—withlabor used by this sector increasing by LALQ. The produc-
tion of non-tradeables may either increase or decrease, and production of
importables will fall. In the case depicted in Figure 3.5 labor has moved out
of irnportables goods sector, into exportables and non—tradeables sectors.
What has happened to factors rewards in the short—run? Wages have
declinedin terms of the exportable good (from W0 to W1 in Figure 3.5).
Also, wages decline In terms of the non—tradeable good, since the vertical
distance between the LN and curves is smaller than the reduction of
W from W0 to W1 Esee Mussa 19714]. However, wages increase relative to the
importable good, since the domestIc price of Importables has fallen by more
than wages. In the exportables sector, the rental rate of capital will
increase in terms of all three goods, while the rental rates of the capital
decrease.
Formally, the rental rate of capital specific to the importable sector
will decrease in terms of importables, and could either increase or
decrease In terms of the other two goods. With respect to capital
specific to the non—tradeables sector, its rentalrate will in terms of
flOn—tradeables,and could either increase or decrease In terms of the
other two goods.—k 14—
The above discussion has a3sumed that all prices (of goods and
factors) are fully flexible. However, this needs not be the case. In a
number of countries the labor market is usually characterized by the existence
of (real) minimumwages.It is easy to see fromFigure3.5 that If wages,
expressed in terms of exportables are inflexibly downward, short—run unemploy-
ment will result as a consequence of the reduction of tariffs. In terms of
Figure35,the magnitude of this unemployment will be equal to distance
FG. This unemployment will only be a short—run phenomenon, which will tend to
disappear as capital moves between sectors in the medium and long—run. In
general, in the presence of sector specific capital and wage rigidity in the
short-run, there will be a second—best argument for slow trade liberalization
and adjustment assistance. The first—best policy, however, Is to act directly
on the labor market, removing the sources of wage rigidity.
Under the assumption ofwageflexibility, the short-run effect or
trade liberalization on the levels of production can be depicted in Figure
3.6.The initial (pre—reform) equilibrium is givei by points A and G,
with production of exportables proportional to distance OA, production of
non—tradeables given by iocost N0,andproduction of importables
See Neary (1982) and Edwards (1982) for discussions regarding trade
liberalization, sticky wages and unemployment. It i$ interesting to note
that an effect of this type can be used to analytically derive short—run
output losses following a trade liberalization process, as is done by Khan
andZahler (1983).
Inthe specific case of Chile, the tariff—reform proceeded at the same
timeas the minimum wage was raisedinreal terms. Elsewhere I have
computed that the combination of thetariffreduction process and the
increase Intheminimum wage in Chile resulted in an increase in the rate
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proportional to distance GA. Notice that Initially the nontradeable goods
sector usesONKN capital, the exportables sector uses OK capital, and
the importables will use the rest (KNKx). Since intheshort—run capital is
sector specific these amountsofcapital will also be used by each sector
after the tariff reform. This means that the new short-run equilibrium points
will necessarily lay on the KNKN and KKlines.
The tariff reduction will result in an increase in the use of labor
(and thus in production, for given amounts of capital) in the exportables and
importables sectors. This is shown in Figure 3.6 by the movement of the
equilibrium points to B and F. The new capital—labor ratios are now given
by the dashed lines, and as may be seen both the exportable and nontradeable
sectors become relatively more labor intensive, while the importables sector
has become more capital intensive. A comparison of Figures 3.3 and 3.6
provides some indication on how the transition period will look like, with
factors moving from their post—reform short—run allocation (Figure 3.6)
towards thair long-run post-reform allocation (Figure 3.7).
In summary, for the general case with wage flexibility, the short-run
effects of a tariff redubtiori on production, prices, arid factors rewards are
the following:
(i) Production of exportables increases.
(ii)Production of importables is reduced.
(iii) Production of nontradeables increases.
(iv)Wages increase in terms of importables, and decline intermsof
exportables and nontradeables
(v) The rental rate of capital in the exportable sector
increases relative to all goods.—147
(vi) The rental rate of capital in the irnportables sectorwill decrease
relative to the importable good. It could increase ordecrease
relative to the other goods.
(vii) The rental rate of capital in the non-tradeablessector will
increase relative to non—tradeable goods, andcould either increase
or decrease relative to the other two goods.
3.2.3 The Transition Period After aTradeLibera1i
According to the model used in this section the maindifference
between short— and long-run effects of a tradeliberalization is that In the
short-run capital ISlockedinto Its sector of origIn. As time passes,
however, capital will (slowly) move between sectors.In the present model,
and in order to simplify the exposition, we assume thatthe movement of
capital does not require the use of resources. However,the analysis could be
modified by introducing a "moving industry", which useslabor and some
specific factor, as In Mussa [1978].
The transition period will, be basically characterized byfactors
(both capital and labor) moving between sectors,until the new long-run
equilibrium (i.e., post-liberalization) capital—labor
ratios and levels of
production are attained. As discussed inSection 3.2.1, and as may be seen
from Figure 3.3, in the final long—run equilibrium allsectors will be more
capital—intensive, with the exportable sector using morecapital, in absolute
terms; and with the importable sector using less capitalin absolute terms
than prior to the trade reform. As may be also seenfrom Figure 3.3, the non-
tradeable goods sector could use either a larger or smallabsolute amount of
capital than before the tariffs reduction.Th.e nature of factors movements
during the transition period cn be seen in Figure3.7, which combines Figures








points A and G. Short—run equilibrium is given by pointsB and F; while
long-run equilibrium will be attained in pointsHandC.In order to avoid
cluttering the diagram, only the post—liberalization capital—labor ratios have
been drawn. The arrows between points B and C and F and H, respect-
ively, show the way resources will move during the transition. As may be seen
in Figure 3.7, for the particular case considered here, the transition will be
characterized by:
(I) Capital and labor will move out of the importable goods sector;
(ii) Capital and labor will move into the exportable goodssector;
(iii) Capital will move into the r'iontradeable goods sector, and
labor will move out of the nontradeable goods sector.
Table 3.1 summarizes the movement of resources that follows a trade
liberalization. Column (1) depicts the movement of resources in the short—
run.Column (2) shows how resources move in the long—run, when compared with
theinitial situation. This column is a summary of the situation described in
the Melvin—Edgeworth-BoWly box in Figure 3.3. Finally, in column (3) the
movement of resources during the transition period' is presented.
An important question that has not been discussed yet is related to
the timing of these prices and resources movements. Broadly speaking, it
wouldbeexpected that following a eariff reduction some time would pass
beforegoods arbitrage will result in relative prices adjustments. In that
sensethe initial effect of tariff reductions on resource movements will not
be instantaneous. On the other hand, it is difficult to know a priori,
From a practical point of view there are a number of considerations, like
the creation of therequired infrastructure to increaseimports, that tend







howfast the adjustment process between the short— and long—run will take.
This is largely an empirical question whose answer will require country—
specific analyses.
3.3 The Liberalization of the Capital Account
In this sub—section the model presented above is used to investigate
how the opening of the capital account (only) will affect relative prices,
income distribution, production and resource movements. The analysis assumes
that the icnportables sector is subject to a tariff and that the world relative
price of exportables and importables is constant, so that these two goods can
be aggregated into a single tradeable good.
It is clear that the framework used in this section (a 3 goods—2
factors model) is not the most appropriate one to deal with intertemporal
problems related to the financial sector, as those generated by the openingof
the capital account. However, this model is still rich enough to allow us to
investigate how the opening of the capital account will affect the real side
of the economy. In order to do this, an approach similar to that
suggested by McKinnon 11976] for analyzing a transfer related adjustment is
used.. 1t is assumed that prior to the bpening of the capital account the
domestic rate of time preferences exceeds the world rate of interest. This
means that once the capital account is opened, domestic agents willborrow
from abroad in order to increase present consumption. It is further assumed
that all of the foreign fundsobtained,once the capital account is opened are
Ideally one would want a fully specified multi-period general equilibrium
model of both the real and financial sectors of the economy. Clearly,
however, a model of this kind is not analytically tractable. An
alternative way to tackle the problem of the opening of the capital
account is to use a simulation fr'amework as in Khari and Zahier (1983).—52—
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usedto increase present consumption.21"Eventhough this is not a very
realistic assumption, it simplifies the exposition. The casewhere the funds
obtainedwhen the capital account are used to increase investmentis discussed
in the next section. The discussion will then focus on the adjustmentproblem
created by the inflow of foreign capital that will follow the openingof the
capital account.
The analysis presented in this section assumes that once the capital
account is opened, foreign capital will flow into the domestic economyat a
stable rate for some time. This means that during a certaIn perIodof time
expenditure will exceed income and foreign debt willbe accumulated. For
expositional convenience this discussion does not deal specificallywith the
following stage, where the foreign debt has to be paid. However,the analytical
tools developed here can easily handle this stage of the problem.It is
possible to say, then, that in this section thetime horizon for the analysis
has been broken into three distinct runs: the short—run,characterized by
positive foreign borrowing, and sector—specific capital;the long—run, where
there still is a positive inflow of foreign funds, but where capitalcan move
between sectors; and the long-lonrufl (nQt specificallyconsidered), where the
foreign debt begins to be repaid.
21'Weabstract, then, from the issues related to welfare reducinginvestment
discussed in Section 2.2. See, however, Section 14
This idea responds to the notion, developed by Fischer andFrenkel (1972a,
l972b) among others, that there are stages of the different accountsof
the balance of payments through which contries pass. In that sense, then,
we assume that our country is in the. stage of developmentwhere foreign
debt is accumulated.
Of course, once the foreign debt has to be repaid the analysiswill be
similar to what is discussed here, in the sense that a distinctionbetween
the period when capital is sector-specific and when it can move across
sectors has to be made.—514—
The basic effect of opening the capital account is that expenditure
will exceed income during some period of time. In order to simplify the
discussionthe core of thissub—section assumes that the amount by which
expenditureexceeds income (i.e., the currentaccount deficit) isthe same in
every period. However, the case where there is an initial overshootingof the
levelof capital inflows, as discussed in Section 2.2, is also briefly
investigated. The relevance of this latter case stems from the fact that it
has generally been observed that following an opening of the capital account
there is a jump, and consequent reduction (i.e., an overshooting), of the
level of capital inflows (for example, Korea 1965; Chile 1980; Argentina 1978;
Uruguay 1979).
3.3.1 Long—Run Effects
In the long—run -—whencapital can move between sectors --relative
prices of the three goods are completely given by world prices, technologyand
the tariff [see the discussion in Section 11.2]. For this reason, in the
present model the opening of the capital account will have no long-run effect
on relative prices of gooçls or factors. However, to the extent that a
fraction of the new funds obtained from abroad are used to finance a higher'
consumption of non-tradeables, the production of these goods will increase.
Since a higher production of N, requires an increase in the amount of
However, as will be discussed below, in the short—run there will be







resources used in that sector, production of the two tradeable goods will have
to decline. The long-run effects of the opening of the capital account on
production can be summarized in Figure 3.8, which is a by—now familiar Melvin—
Edgeworth-Bowley box. The initial equilibrium conditions are summarized by
points G and A. Since in the long-run the opening of the capital account
has no effect on relative prices or factors rewards, the original capital—
laborratiosarenotaltered. The increase in the demandfornontradeables,
however, requIres a hIgherproduction of thIstypeof goods. The expansIonof
the nontradeable goods sector will then take place along the original capital
labor ratio ONG, with new (after liberalization) production of nontradeables
proportional to distance OMG, and given by isoquant NM1; new production
of exportables will be proportional to distance XA'; andnew production of
importableswill be proportional to distance G'A'. It can then be seen that
the long—run effects of opening the capital account will be the
(i)Production of nontradeables will Increase, with capital and labor
moving into this sector.
(ii) Production of importables will decrease, with capital and labor
moving out of this sector.
(iii) Production of exportables will decrease, with capital and labor
moving out of this sector.
(iv) Prices of goods and factors will not be altered.
3.3.2 The Short—Run Effects
In the short-run, however,capitalwill be sector—specific, and the
increase in the demand for riontradeable goods will be reflected in an increase—57—
of their relative price. The short—run effects of a capital inflow on
production can be summarized in a Salter—type diagram, as used byMoKinnon
[1976] in his analysis of transfers and the adjustment problem. In Figure
3.9, the importable and exportable goods have been aggregated into a composite
tradeables good. TT is the (short—run) production possibilities curve between
tradeables and nontradeables and has been constructed under the assumption
that when relative prices change only labor can move between sectors. Initial
equilibrium is attained at point Q, with the trade account being equal to
zero, and the nontradeable goods market in equilibrium. Theinflow of capital
that takes place after the opening of the capital account has the property of
allowing the consumption possibilities schedule to exceed the production
possibilities frontier. The new consumption possibilities schedule is equal
to NT, which exceeds TT by the amount of the capital inflow, measured in
terms of tradeables [see McKinnon 1976, and Datta 1983].
After the opening of the capital account, and assuming that OE is
the income—expenditure path corresponding to the initial relative price,
consumption will tend to move to S, while production will remain at Q.
However, at this point there wilt be an excess demand for nontradeables
goods. As a result of this, the relative price of riontradeables will increase
untila new equilibrium situation, characterized by points R (consumption)
and T (production) is attained. In this new equilibrium there is a current
account deficit, and the non-tradeab1- goods market is in equilibrium. We can
fJJ Rememberthat we area.ssurniig thit the magnitude of the current account
deficitisthe same in the 5hr't- and long—run. See sub—section 3.3.3,
however, f or a brief analysis f' the case where there Is an overshooting










see,then, that in the short—run the opening of the capital account will
result in an increase of the relative price of nontradeables relative to
tradeables ——thisis the real appreciation effect of opening the capital
account pointed out by several authors, and discussed in Section 2.1. The
production of nontradeables will increase from N0 to N1, and the produc-
tion of tradeables will decline from T0 to T1 in Figure 3.9.
We can now translate the short—run effects of opening the capital
account into a Melvin-Edgeworth-Bowley box. This will prove to be useful f or
the analysis of the transition. Figure 3.10 summarizes the short—run effects
of opening the capital account.Initial equilibrium conditions are given by
points G and A. Once the capital account is opened, expenditure will
exceedincome, with production of nontradeables increasingand that of import-
ables and exportables decreasing. New (short-run) equilibrium is attainedat
pointsH and G, which, by definition, are characterized by the fact that
the same amount of capital is used in each sector as prior to the liberali-
zation process. However in order to increase its putput, the nori—tradeables
sector becomes more labor intensive; while both tradeables sectors become more
capital intensive.
-
Inthe short-run the wage rate increase in terms of both tradeable
goods and declines in terms of non-tradeables. The return to capital specific
to the rion—tradeables sector goes up in terms of all goods, while the return
to capital in the two non-tradeable goods declines.
See McKinnon (1973, 1976, 1982), Harberger (1982), Diaz—Alejandro (1981),
Harberger and Edwards (1982), Oline (1983), Edwards (19814).







Insummary, the short—run effects of the opening of the capital
account are the following:
(1) Relative price of nontradeables increases in terms of both tradeable
goods.
(ii) Production of nontradeables increases.
(iii) Production of both nontradeables decline.
(iv)The wage rate increases in terms of both nontradeables and declines in
termsofthe nontradeable.
Cv) The rental rate of capital in both tradeable goods sectors declines,
in terms of all goods.
(vi)The return to capital in the nontradeable goods sector goes up in terms
of all goods.
3.3.3 Transition
As in the case of the trade liberalization, the transition will be
characterized by resources moving from their short—run equilibrium (Figure
3.10) towards their long—run equilibrium (Figure 3.8). As before, the best
way to look at these resource novements is by combining the short— and long—
run diagrams. This is done in Figure 3.11. In this diagram A and G are
initial (i.e., pre—liberalization) equilibrium points; H and B depict the
short—run equilibrium after liberalization; and A' and G' are the long—run
post-liberalization equilibrium points. It may be noted that in Figure 3.11
the final equilibrium level of production of N, given by isoquant NN1(G')
exceeds short—run level of production (given by the isoquarit that passes
through point H). The reason for this result is that while the income effect
——stemmingfrom the higher absorption allowed by the opening of the capital








priceof nontradeables is higher in the short—run. Consequently the equili-
brium level of production of non—tradeables will be higher in the long—
run. .-_"If,however, it is assumed that in the short—run the level of
capital inflows will overshoot their long—run levels, the result will be
somewhat different [see Figure 3.12 below].
Under the present assumptions --thatthe current account deficit is
thesame in short- and long-run -—thetransition will be characterized by
resources moving from H to G' and from B to A' in Figure 3.11.
Capital and labor will move into the nontradeables sector and out of both
tradeable sectors. The production of nontradeables will further expand during
the transition, withthe production of both tradeables declining. Table 3.2
presents a summary of the short- and long—run resource movements that will
followan opening of the capital account, under the maintained assumptions.
This table is equivalent to Table 3.1 constructed for the case of the trade
reformonly. A comparison of both tables shows that both reforms, on their
own, will tend to generate opposite movement of resources.This fact, of
course, is reflected by the fact that the real exchange rate willtend to move
in opposite directions under each reform.
At this point, it is important to recall some of the critical assump-
tions that have been made for this exercise. First, it was assumed that as a
consequence of the opening of the capital account, capital wouldflow into the
domestic country, allowing absorption to exceed income. It wasfurther
The reason for this is that while in both cases (short— and long—run) the
demand curve for non-tradeables will shift to the right by the same
amount, the supply curve is more elastic in the long—run. Thus, the
equilibrium output of non-tradeables will be higher in the long—run.—6 —
assumedthat this situation was sustainable for a (fairly) long periodof
time,and that allthe fundsobtainedfrom abroad werechanneled into addi-
tional consumption. In that sense in this section the timehorizon of the
analysis was broken into three distinct lengths. The short-run,characterized
by a positive foreign borrowing (absorption > income),and by capital being
sector specific. The long—run, where there also is positive borrowing
(absorption > income) but where capital can move between sectors;and the
long-long—run when the foreign debt has to be paid.It was assumed that the
long-long-run takes place in the (distant) future, and wasnot analyzed.
A second important assumption made here is that once the capital
account is opened a stable inflow of foreign capital takes place.In that
sense, the possibility of an overshooting of thelevel of capital flows was
ignored. This is not an innocent simplification, since, ashasbeen
mentioned, the stylized facts indicate that generally followingthe opening of
the capital account there is an initial jump in the levelof capital
inflows. If such a behavior of capital flows was allowed, the analysis
presented here will change with more resources moving intothe rioritradeable
goods sector into the short—run. This case is presentedin Figure 3.12, where
short-run production of non-tradeables --givenby isoquant NN2 —-exceeds
long—run production of this kind of goods (given by isoquarit NN1).In this
case the transition will differ from our previous analysis.As may be seen in
Figure 3.12, in this case while capital will move into thenontradeable
sector, labor will move out of the non-tradeable goods sectorduring the
transition.
A critical question related to he effects of opening the capital
account of the balance of payments has to do with the speed atwhich these—65—
Table 3.2
Short—and LongRun Resource Movements
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price and resource movements will take place. In general --andas has been
emphasized by Frenkel [1982, 1983] ——itis expected that the inflow of
capital following the opening of the capital account will be fast. In that
case then, it is expected that the short—run consequences of liberalizing this
account of the balance of payments -—inparticular the increase of the
relative price of N and the tendency for labor to move into this sector ——
willbe felt quickly. In fact, as will be argued below, and has been
suggested by Frenkel [1983], the difference in the speed of adjustment of the
capital and current account suggests that an appropriate order will consider
opening the currentaccountfirst. It will also be argued that the capital
accountshould be opened slowly, following a multi—stage procedure.
3.4 Summary
Thissection has presented a three-goods two—factors model to analyze
thereal effects -—i.e.,production and income distribution effeäts -—ofthe
liberalizationofthecurrent and capital account of thebalance ofpayments.
Theanalysis presented provided details on thecharacteristics ofthese
processes,comfirmirig prior conjectures: each reform on its own will result
in opposite effects on resource movements and incc*ne distribution.
Abandoning the sphere of positive analysis, a critical question at
this stage is If there is anything to be learned regarding the appropriate
order of liberalization from this liscussion? The answer to this question is
a qualified yes. To the extent that in the real world resource movements
across sectors are costly, there Ls ir'easonto try to avoid "unnecessary"—67—
shiftsin resources. A possible instance where these kind of costs will
occur will emerge if, for example, due to a given policylabor and capital
move out of the exports sector, and shortly afterwards,due to a different
policy labor andcapitalhave to move back into this sector. These
"unnecessary" adjustmentcosts could be avoided if resources are directly
reallocated into their final sectors of use. This could beachieved by
syiachronizirtthe openings of the capital and current accounts as has been
suggested by Frenkel (1983), At this point itcould be argued that the
principlesof reducing the adjustment costs would call for a simultaneous
openingof both accounts. In this case, the argument would go, resources
would move directly into their final sectors without "unnecessary"switches.
The problem with this reasoning, however, is that it implicitly assumesthat
the adjustment process following the opening of these accountsis equally
fast. If however, this is not the case, and the adjustment of the capital
account is faster ——asFrenkel 1982, 1983, Khan and Zahier (1983) and others
have suggested ——thesimultaneous opening of both accounts will result in
resources moving first into the non-tradeable goodssector and outof
exportables and importables. Indthe.rwords, if both accounts are opened
simultaneously, in the short-run the capital account effectswill tend to
dominate. If the capital account adjusts faster, the avoidance of
A possible way to model moving costs is through the existenceof a "moving
sector" as in Mussa (1978).
In terms of this model a faster adjustment of the capital account means
that interest arbitrage is faster than good arbitrage,and that
immediately following the opening of the capital account resourceswill be
borrowed and absorption will exceed absorption. On the otherhand,
following trade reform some time will pass befOre goods arbitrage will







"unnecessary" adjustment costs, and the synchronization of both effectswould
be obtainedfollowing the order of liberalization suggested by Jacob Frenkel
(1982, 1983): the current account should be opened first, and only whenthis
is open should restrictions on capital movements be restricted.
1LWelfare Implications ofOpening The Capital Account In thePresence of
TradeDistortions
As discussed in Section 2 above, one of the arguments that has been
used to suggest that the trade account should be liberalized first Is that if
capital inflows are allowed In the presence of trade distortions(i.e.,
tariffs) welfare losses will result [McKinnon 1973; Frenkel 1982, 1983;
Krueger 1983]. In this section this proposition is investigated indetail
using a multi—period general equilibrium model of a small open economy.
First we investigate the welfare effects of allowing foreign borrowing in an
economy without trade distortions. The results obtained are,of course, the
standard ones: welfare will increase if prior to the liberalization of the
capital account the domestic consumption rate of interest exceedsthe world
rate of interest. Next we introduce tariffs into the picture and investigate
the welfare effects of opening up the capital account in the presence oftrade
distortions. The analysis shows, as it wassuggestedin Section 2.2, that the
welfare effects of opening the capital account will depend on how the funds
obtainedare used. If these resources are used to increase present consurnp
tion, and the domestic consumption rate of interest exceeds theworld rate of
JJ' Much of the discussion in this section draws from Section 3.1 of a joint
paper with Sweder van Wijnbergen. See Edwards andVan Wijnbergefl (1983).—70—
interest, the opening of the capital account can never be welfare deteriorat-
ing. If, however, these funds areusedto finance capital accumulation,
welfare may deteriorate as long as the importable goods is capital intensive.
Asdiscussedin Section 2.2, this is a direct extension of the literature on
welfare—reducingcapital accumulation in a static framework.
An important question regarding this line of argument is the
following: Why would the resources borrowed from abroad be used to accumulate
capital,if society's welfare will be reduced? The answer isthat, while
sociallycapital accumulation might be immiserizing (since it increases a pre-
existing distortion), privately it may be profitable. Indeed this will be the
case since, under the assumptions of capital intensive importables, due to the
presence of tariffs the marginal product of capital in the domestic country
will exceed the world marginal product of capital [Stolper and Samuelson
l9'3]. It is also possible to show that If shadow prices are used to make
investment decisions the opening of the capital account can never result in
welfare reductions [Edwards and van Wljribergen, 1983].
14,] ii!Model
Themodel assumes a two—period world where total welfare depends on
the levels of utility obtained in periods 1 and2 respectively.If foreign
borrowing is not allowed, in each period the budget constraint has to hold,
See, for example, Johnson (1967), Bertrand and Flatters (1971) and Brecher
and Diaz-Alejandro (1977).—71 —
withtotal expenditures being equal to total revenues. In this section a
general version of the model (with trade distortions)is presented. In
Section 14.2 the welfare effects of opening the capital account(i.e., allowing
a small amount of foreign borrowing) is investigatedunder the simplifying
assumptionof no—trade distortions. InSection 14.3 the assumption of trade
distortionsare reintroduced into the analysis.
It is assumed that there are two goods in the economy CXandY).
Good X is taken to be the numeraire and isassumed to be the exportable
(i.e.,the labor intensive good). It is also assumed that prior to opening
thecapital account the domestic consumption rate of interest exceedsthe
world rate of' iriteres (r*). The essentials of the model, under the assump-
tion that foreign borrowing is forbidden are presented in equations(14.1)
through (14.8), where throughout the analysis a super index Irefers to the
ith period. [For analyses using this kind of' model see, for example, Svensson
and Razin 1983; Van Wljnbergen 19814; and Edwards and van Wijnbergen
1983]. .12/
fi2! Insome sense the effect3 of opening the capital account can be analyzed
asa two—way transfer, where the domestic country receives atransfer in
the first periodandgives a (1rger) transfer in the second period.
.121'SeeDixit and Norman (1980) for a clearexpositionof the use of duality













Equation(14.1) is the welfare function which is assumedtobe weakly
separable. The subutilitiesU1 andU2,for periods 1 and 2 respectively
(equation (14.2)) are assumed to be identical and homothetic.Given the hotno—
theticityassumptions of U1 and U2, the underlying expenditurefunctions
for each period E1 andE2 can be written as equation (11.3),where
ll and U2 [equations (14.14) and (14.6)] are "exact" price indexes and are
equal to unitary expenditure functions..11!' Equation (14.6) establishes that
the domestic relative price of the inportable (Pr) is equalto the world
price (F) plus a tariff r.Notice that by (14.6) we are assuming that
prices do not change between periods 1 and 2. Even thoughthis assumption
greatly simplifies the exposition, it is not essentialfor the results
obtained [see Edwards and Van Wijnbergen 1983, for a similar discussionwhere
the domestic price declines in period 2 due to the reduction of thelevel
IL" SeeDixit and Norman (1980) for the properties of an expenditure
function. On exact price indexes see Svenssofl and Razin(1983) and van
Wijnbergen (19814).—73—
of the tariff.] Equation (11.7) is the budget constraintfor periods 1and 2
respectively.This equation captures the assumption of a closed capital
account, since it indicates that total revenues——givenby the revenue
function R plus tariff collection iM —-hastoequal total expenditure in
each period. If on the other hand a fully open capitalaccount is assumed
equations (11.7) would be replaced by a single intertemporalbudget cons-
traint. .1?-"Equation(11.8) defines the level of imports In every period.
Total imports are equal to the difference between the quantitiesdemanded and
supplied of good y in each period.
One of the simplifying assumptions of the model is that priorto the
opening of the capital account there is no capitalaccumulation in the economy
(i.e., dK10). However, it is assumed that when the capital account is
opened domestic firms canborrowabroad and use the proceeds of these loans to
increase their capital stock. While this is clearly a simplifyingassumption
it allows us to focus on the essentials.
11.2 Opening the Capital Account in the Absence of Trade Distortions
Assume, in order to simplify the discUssiOrl and to set upthe general
analytical framework, that tariffs are equal to zero: t= 0.Consider now
that a small amount of foreign borrowing is allowed, andthat the proceeds of
this loan areusedto increase present consumption. Analytically we assume
See van Wijnbergen (19811) for example., and Edwards and van Wijnbergen
(1983).
However, It is possible to interpret the results presentedhere as
resulting from an increment in the rate of capitalaccumulation, which is
made possible b the opening of the capital account.—711—
thatthe loan is in terms of the numeraire good. However, under the assuinp-
tion of an open economy, domestic agents will obtain the desired consumption
bundle through international exchange [see Dixit andNorman,1980].
Under the present assumptions, the opening of the capital account
will imply that consumption will increasein period 1 bythe amount ofthe
loan,and will decrease in period 2, by a larger amount, since principal plus
interest have to be paid in that period. The effects of this operation on the
levels of utility in periods 1 and 2 can be found by totally differentiating
equation (11.7). The effect of opening the capital account on total welfare
(W) is then found by totally differentiating equation (4.1) and by then
inserting the results for dU1 and dU2.
The changes in utility in periods 1 and 2 are given by expressions
(4.9) and (4.10) respectively where dB is the amount borrowed in period 1,
which is fully used to increase present consumption, and where r* is the
world rate of interest.
dU1 =(l/E11)
dB > 0 ('4.9)
U
and
dU2 =— [(l+r*)/E22]dB < 0 (4.10)
U
The total effect on welfare of allowing (some) foreign borrowing is
then obtained by totally differentiating equation (1Ll), and by using (4.3),
(4.9), and (4.10).




isequal to the inverse of one plus the consumption rateof interest In the
domestic country (1 +CR1). Underthe assumption of closed, capital
account, assuming that intertemporal substitutions is not allowed,the
consumptionrate ofinterest will exceed the world rate of interest r*.
Consequently,(1 +r*)A< 1 and In equation (i.ll)
> 0 ('1.11')
Theopening of the capital account will be welfare improving. Of
course, if prior to the opening of the capital account presentconsumption was
"too high" in the domestic economy X(l+r*) will be smaller than one.In
this case, however, the opening of the capital account will still bewelfare
improving since once it Is opened the domestic country willlend in the world
market! In that case (.ll) would be dW[(l+r*)A -1](3W/fl1aU1)dB. Of
course, what generates an improvement in welfare is toallow (some) Inter—
temporal substitution of consumption, which waspreviouslybanned.
Assumenowthat once the capital account is opened, the proceeds from
the foreigri loans are used toincrease 'capital accumulation in the domestic
country(i.e., machines are Imported). This will allow the economyto
increase production in period i.J—!Inperiod 2, however, the loan has to be
paid. In order to simplify the discussion it will be assumed,at his stage of
.IJSee,for example the discussion in Svenssori and Razin (1983, p. 109-
110). See also Van rJijnbergen (19814).
It is assumed that capital begins producing in the same period it is
installed. Alternatively it could be assumed that there was a one period
lag. The'results will remain essentially the same, however.—76—
the analysis, that the loan is also paid in the form ofmachines (i.e.,
disinvestment takes place in the second period).
Totally differentiating (4.7), and('Li)the following expression,
very similar to (4.11), is found ——whereRK, the partial derivative of the
revenue function in respect to the stock of capital and is equalto the
domestic marginal productivity of capital [see Dixit and Norman(1980)]:
dW =[1—(l+r)A](3W/ItlU1)RK dK (4.12)
As may be seen, also in this case if the consumptIon rate of Interest
exceeds the world interest rate (i.e.,(1 +r*)A< 1) the opening of the
capital account -—wherethe proceeds from the loan are used to accumulate
capital -—willbe welfare improving (i.e., dW/dK > 0). The main difference
between (4.12) and (4.11) is that instead of dB we now have RKdK.This
last term, of course, represents the increase in national income in period 1,
in terms of the numeraire good, resulting from an increase in the stockof
capitalequalto dK. From the comparison of (4.11)and(4.12)it follows
thatto the extent that the price of machines in terms of the numeraire good,
(i.e., Tobin's "q")isequal to (1/RK) it Is indifferent whether once
foreign borrowing is allowed the resources obtained fromabroadare used to
add one machine to the stock of capital or directly to increase present
consumption.21!Aswill be shown inSection4.3below this is notthe case
oncetrade distortions are allowed into the picture. the reason for thisis
that, while in the presence of trade distortions, the private priceof
11!Ofcourse, this price of capital (1/RK) can be used toformulate the
presentproblem in a way such th3tthe loan is paid in the form of goods,
andnot of machines.Theresul.ti,however,areexactlythe same as those
presented here.—77—
machines is still (l/RK), fromasocial perspective this price is lower arid
couldeven be negative.







Assume, as before, that the world rate ofinterest isequal to r*.
Asin the previouscase, consider first what happens whenthe proceeds from
theforeign loan are fully used to increase presentconsumption. The effects
oneach period's utility of a loan obtained in period1 and repaid (with an
interest equal to r*) in period 2 is now given by(14.13) and (14.114):





dU2 =— j__ _l }(l+r)dB (14.114)
(1TdE
U2 y
where dEy captures the pure income effect on thedemand for y resulting





it is assumedthat there is a tariff on the import of
andthe welfare effect of opening the capital
Followinglast section's strategy Itis first
fromthe foreign loan areusedexclusively to—78—
fromchangesin real income.12! Since tdEy is smaller than one, (14.12) will
be positive and (14.13) negative..2! As before, the effect on total welfare is




)dB (14.15) 1 —
whichunder ourassumptionsof X(1+r*) < 1 is greater than zero. That means
that In the presence of trade restrictions allowing foreign-borrowing to
increase present consumption is still welfare improving.
Assume now that the private sector uses the proceeds of the foreign
loans to increase its stock of capital. That would be the case ifthe(world)
priceof a machine, in terms of the numeraire good is equal or lower than
(l/RK).
Assume inorder to simplify the exposition that this price is
exactly equal to (l/RK). In this case the welfare effect of opening the
capital account, under the assumption that the loan is also paid in •the form
of machines, will be given by equation (14.16):
12.!Inorder to derive (5.12) and (5.13) the following property was used: dEy
= See Dixit andNorman(1980, p. 62).
This statement can be proven in the following way: Py is the
marginal propensity to spend on y and consequently smaller than one.
Also, since Py > titfollows that (PydEy) (fr—)= dEyt< 1.
Thus (1 —IdE
> 1.—79—
dW[1 —(l+r*)A](3W/]113U1)(RK —TRPK)[l/(l_tdE)] dK ('4.16)
where R1, 1<is a Rybczynski term that captures the effect of capital
y
accumulation on the production of the importable good. Given our assumption
regarding factors proportions ——theimportable good y is capital intenzive
in our developing economy -—RK > o
y
Equation (14.16) is interesting for several reasons. First, as may be
seen it can be either positive or negative. It can be negative even If the
world rate of interest Is below the consumption rate of Interest [I.e.,
(l+r*)X < 1]. This will be the case if < rRKThis is nothing else
8 than the Johnson [1967] condition f or imrniserizing capital accumulation.
Intuitively the possibility that the opening of the capital account
will result in a welfare loss Is easy to explain. Under the presence of
tariffs there will be a difference between the private and social marginal
productivities of capital. While the private marginal productivity of capital
is K (as it was in the absence of tariffs), its social marginal If shadow
prices are used to make investment decisions this welfare reducing effect of
opening the capital account in the presence of trade distortions will not
arise [Edwards and van Wljnbergen 1983]. Productivity Is(RK -
TRPK).!
Itis interesting to note that, contrary to the Brecher—Diaz—Alejandro
(1977) one—period analysis on foreign investment, if > tRK capital
accumulation cannot be immenserizing even if r* =RK.The reson for
this is that in the present intertemporal framework the important
comparisonis between r* and the consumption rate ofinterest, and not
between and r*.
An alternative way of looking at this is comparing RK evaluated at
domestic tariff inclusive prices, and evaluated at world prices. It is
easy to show that this last expression will be equal to (RK —
y—80—
The reason for this is that capital accumulation will resultin lower total
imports and thus lower tariffs collection (termtM in equation 14.1). It is
possible then that the negative effect on welfare of thereduction of tariffs
collections will generate anoverallwelfare reduction. This is a typical
secondbest type of argument that indicates that reducing some distortions
only can result intotalwelfare being reduced. Ofcourse,ifshadowprices
areused to make investment decisions this welfare reducing effectof opening
the capital account in the presence of trade distortionswill not arise
[Edwards and van Wijnbergeri 1983].
5.SummaryandConcluding Remarks
Inthis paper I have surveyed some of the most important issues
relatedto the order of liberalization ofthe current and capital accounts of
thebalance of payments. This topic has recently attracted considerable
attentionboth from academic and policy—oriented circles. From a theoretical
point of view the question of the appropriate orderof liberalization is only
relevant in a world with some kind of adjustment costs, market imperfections
and/or externalities.If, onthe contr4ary, a textbook economy free of
imperfections is assumed, the answer to this question becomestrivial: both
accounts of the balance of payments should be liberalized simultaneouslyand
instantaneously.However, there are a number ofreasons, both economic and
political,why a simultaneous arid instantaneous liberalization mightnot be
feasible. In this context, then, the question regardingthe order of libera-
lization becomes important.—81—
The problem of the order of liberalization of the current and capital
accounts of the balance of payments has become more interesting in lightof
the recent experience of a group of countries from the Cone of SouthAmerica
(Argentina, Chile and Uruguay). These countries followed opposite orders-—
Argentinaand Uruguay opened the capital account first, while Chile opened the
currentaccount first—— with a common fate in theearlyl980s: deep economic
recessionand (partial) reversal of theliberalization attempt. This
Southern-Coneexperience has triggered greater concern on the issue of the
adequate order of liberalization. At the present time there are no definite
answers regarding these experiences and more research on the subject should be
encouraged.
The present paper has focused exclusively on the analysis of some
aspects of the order of liberalization of the capital and current accountsof
the balance of payments. However, there area number ofimportant issues
relatedto a broadly defined liberalization process that deserve to be briefly
mentioned.There are four majorissuesrelated to these reforms: First, if a
liberalization will not fully eliminate all distortions, the question of
welfare effects of partial reforms will become critical. Even though from a
second—best perspective almost anything, in terms of welfare, can happen as a
consequence of a partial reform, there are well founded conjecturesthat the
liberalization of somemarketsonly will be welfare improving..i"Second,
the question of the speed of liberalization is also Important. In the absence
of market imperfections and/or exterrtalities, markets should be liberalized
very quickly (now). If externaUties are present, however, and thefirst best
Krueger (l983b), Michaely (1.932), Corbo de Melo (1982).—82—
policies to deal with them arenotavailable, a gradual liberalization might
be called for.!! Third, the relationship betweenliberalization and
stabilization is crucial to understand the success or failureof liberaliza-
tion reforms, since most liberalization attempts have beenundertaken in con-
junctionwith major stabilization programs. The reason for this is that,
inthe first place, the initial Imposition of restrictionsand controls is
usually related to an increase in the fiscal deficit andinflation. There are
some important aspects of the relationship betweenthese two policies ——
stabilizationand liberalization ——thatdeserve further attention. In
particular, the desirability of implementing a major(almostfull) liberaliza—
tionat the same time as a stabilization program ison its way, should be
furtherinvestigated. And, fourth, theorder of liberalization (i.e.,which
market should be liberalizedfirst) is alsoimportant. There is generalized
agreementamong experts about some aspects of theorder of liberalization.
There is agreement, for example, that the capital accountshould only be
opened after the domestic capital market is freed,and that this can only
happen after the fiscal deficit has been substantiallyreduced. There has
been less agreement, however, on the .order of liberalizationof the capital
andcurrent accounts. This is the topic that has been discussedin the
present paper.
In Section 2 of the present paper the existing literature onthe
order of liberalization of the capital and current accountsof the balance of
See Learner (1981), Mussa (1982), Neary(1982),Edwards (1982), Michaely
(1982) and Edwards and van 4ijnbergefl (1983).
See Krueger (1978, 1981, l983a), LIttle (1982).—83—
payments was critically reviewed, and some interpretations weresuggested.
The existingarguments were grouped in three broad categories for this
discussion. The first line of argument isconcerned with real exchange rate
behaviorandmacroeconomicstability during the liberalization effort. Some
authors have argued that to the extent that the opening of the capital account
will generate destabilizing capital flows, the real exchange rate will be
highly volatile after this account is liberalized. For this reason,the
reasoning goes, the capital account should only be opened after thetrade
reform hasbeencompleted, and the new structure of production is "conso-
lidated".Other authors, however, have argued that the best way to avoid
undesired real exchange rate movements is by having a freely floating exchange
rate with full convertibility. This exchange rate system, they argue, should
be implemented before the trade reform. Consequently, according tothis view
the capital account should be liberalized first. The second line of argument
that appears in the literature is related to welfare effects of particular
orderings. This analysis centers on plausible values of crosselasticities
and of indirect welfare effects. The third group of arguments deals withthe
problemofadjustment costs and ttle provision ot adjustment assistance through
cheaper foreign credit. While some authors believe that the higheravaila-
bility of cheaper foreign credit --obtainedthrough the opening of the
capital account -—willhelp the adjustment process, others think that the
effect of this credit will be highly 'indesirable since the "wrong" signals
will be provided, and that capital flows should be avoided during the tran-
sition following a trade reform.—8Z1 —
InSection 3apositive analysis of the effects of liberalizing both
accounts was presented. A three goods-two factors model of trade wasusedto
analyze how both reforms will affect production and income distribution in the
short— andlong—run.The model assumesthatthe short-run can be character-
ized by a Ricardo—Viner setting, while in the long—run a Hecksher—Ohlin
framework Is used. This discussion shows that both reforms, on their own,
willtend to generate opposite effects on production and income distribution.
To the extent that there are real costs related to resource movements, there
isanargument to synchronize the effects of opening both accounts, inorder
toavoid resources moving In and out of particular sectors. If, as has been
suggested by Frenkel [1982, 1983] and Khan and Zahler [1983] among others, the
speed of adjustment of the capital account Is faster than that of the current
account, this synchronization of the economic effects of opening both accounts
will require that the current account is opened first.
InSectiona two-period modelof a small open economy was developed
to analyze the welfare consequences of liberalizing the capital account inthe
presenceof trade distortions. It was shown that these welfare effects will
depend on two key variables. First the relationship, prior to the liberaliza-
tionreform, between the domestic consumption rate of interest and "the" world
interest rate will be critical. Ifthedomestic consumption Interestrate
exceedsthe world rate of interest the opening of the capital account will
result in an importation of capital and welfare will improve. Second, the
social welfare consequences of opening the capital account in the presence of
tariffs will depend on whether the additional funds obtained from abroad are
used for capital accumulation or for consumption.Itwas shown that if funds—85—
areused to increasepresentconsumption welfare will always improve. More-
over it is shown that under these assumptions the welfare increase will be
greaterin the presence oftariff's. If, however, these fundsare used to
increase investment in the presence of tariffs welfare may be reduced as a
consequence of the capital account liberalization. This welfare reduction
will not take place, however, if shadow prices are used to guide investment
decisions.
The purpose of this paper has been to survey the major issues related
to the order of libralization, presenting the different aspects of this
problem in an organized fashion. While the analysis has not yielded a strong
theorem regarding the appropriate order for liberalizing the current and capi-
tal accounts of the balance of payments, both the historical evidence and the
theoretical considerations discussed suggest that a more prudent strategy
would be based on liberalizing the current account first.
A central aspectofany reform package is related to the degree of
credibility that the public has on the reform. If there is no credibility,
agents will not make the decisions required for the new policy to have an
effect: on the economic structure. Moreover, in the particular case of the
liberalization of the current and capital accounts of the balance of payments,
the lack of' credibility can result --aswas the case of Argentina --in
agents using foreign funds to increase investments in the "wrong"
sector. Of course, the degree of'credibilityof a reform package is not
Of course, if the lack of credibility was founded, and the reforms are
reversed, the investment was being done (from a private perspective) in
the "right" sectors.—86—
an exogenous variable, but will depend on a number of variables. One of the
most important determinants of the degree of credibility is the perceived
consistency of the proposed policies. If these policies are perceived as
inconsistent, then agents will expect that the reform attempt will be
discontinued or reverted. This is a basic, but important principle that
should be kept in mind when implementing global economic reforms. In that
sense, it may be argued that more important than determining the correct order
of liberalization, it is important to define consistent and credible policy
packages that will support any particular order that is chosen.—87—
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